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assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a
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I. Introduction
In this paper, we study network games with strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded
in a xed network and interact with their network neighbors. They play a game characterized by
positive interactions and linear best-replies, so an agents action is increasing in her neighbors
actions. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above, which means that the
game is supermodular. Our main result, Theorem 1, establishes that this game always possesses a
unique equilibrium. We then build on this result to further characterize the equilibrium. Overall,
we nd that the presence of an upper bound on actions strongly a¤ects the outcomes of the game.
Our paper contributes to the analysis of games played on xed networks. Ballester, Calvó-
Armengol & Zenou (2006) study network games under linear best-replies and small network
e¤ects. They nd that the equilibrium is necessarily unique and that action is related to network
centrality. However, no equilibrium exists under strategic complements when network e¤ects are
large. Agentsactions feed back into each other in an explosive way and essentially diverge to
innity. This divergence seems irrealistic in many contexts where actions possess natural limits.
Indeed, in their empirical implementation of that model, Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini & Zenou
(2009) discuss the possibility of introducing such bounds. They state:
Let us bound the strategy space in such a game rather naturally by simply acknowl-
edging the fact that students have a time constraint and allocate their time between
leisure and school work. In that case, multiple equilibria will certainly emerge, which
is a plausible outcome in the school setting., Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini & Zenou
(2009, p.1254)
We show that this conjecture does not hold under positive interactions, which is the usual
empirical case. We extend Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2006)s analysis to situations
with large positive network e¤ects and bounded actions. We nd that uniqueness is guaranteed
and we study how the equilibrium depends on the network structure. We develop our analysis
in three steps. First, we apply results of monotone comparative statics for supermodular games
to our setup. Second, we study how network position is related to action. We show that more
central agents may end up playing a lower action. This conrms Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours
(2011)s nding that the tight link between action and centrality only holds for small network
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e¤ects. We show that this link is preserved for interesting families of networks, including nested
split graphs, the line and related hierarchical graphs, and regular graphs. And third, we study
the extent of interdependence in the game. We nd that the interdependence between agents
actions may be broken under large network e¤ects, especially in situations where bridging agents
are central.
At rst glance, uniqueness in this context may indeed seem surprising. On one hand, super-
modular games typically admit multiple equilibria. On the other hand, equilibrium multiplicity
may be quite drastic in network games with linear best replies, under strategic substitutes (see
Bramoullé & Kranton (2007) and Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2011)).1 Our proof makes
clear that uniqueness relies on the combination of linearity and strategic complementarities. In-
troducing enough non-linearity in the best-replies, or enough substituabilities in the interactions,
would lead to multiple equilibria. In a way, linearity and strategic complementarities discipline
each other.
Our study provides one of the rst crossover between the theories of supermodular games and
of network games. Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo & Yariv (2008) analyze network games
under strategic complementarities when agents have incomplete information on the network. We
analyze a game of complete information here.2 Belhaj & Deroïan (2009) analyze communication
e¤orts under strategic complements and indirect network interactions. They look at the line and
related networks. In contrast, we study direct network interactions and obtain results valid for
arbitrary networks. Finally, the proof of our main result relies on a principle of partial contraction
that, to our knowledge, had not yet been identied in the literature on supermodular games. This
principle could potentially be useful in other setups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2. We prove
uniqueness and derive some general properties of the equilibrium in Section 3. We study the
relation between network position and action and the extent of interdependence in Section 4 and
conclude in Section 5.
1At the extreme under perfect substitutes, the number of equilibria may increase exponentially with the number
of nodes in the network, see Bramoullé & Kranton (2007).
2However, we note that an agent only needs to know his neighborsactions to be able to play a best-reply.
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II. The model
Consider n agents embedded in a xed network, represented by a n  n matrix G. The (i; j)th
entry gij is a non-negative real number representing the link between i and j. We consider an
arbitrary weighted network with no self-loop. Formally, gij 2 [0;1[ and gii = 0. Agent i is
directly a¤ected by agent j if gij > 0 and gij then measures the strength of their relation. We
do not impose symmetry so gij could di¤er from gji. In many of our examples, we will look at
binary networks where gij 2 f0; 1g and links do not di¤er in strength.
Agents choose an action xi 2 [0; L] and play a game with best-response
fi(x i) = min(ai + 
nX
j=1
gijxj ; L) (1)
where ai denotes the optimal action of agent i absent social interactions with 0 < ai < L and
 > 0 denotes a global interaction parameter. A Nash equilibrium of the game is a prole of
actions x such that 8i; xi = fi(x i).
We take best-replies as primitives, as in Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2011). So our
results apply to any game characterized by these best-replies. In particular, the game   with
quadratic utilities ui(xi;x i) =  12x2i +aixi+
Pn
j=1 gijxixj belongs to this class. More generally,
consider any functions fi dened over R, increasing over ] 1; 0] and decreasing over [0;1[ and
any real-valued function vi dened over [0; L]n 1. Then the game with payo¤s i(xi;x i) =
fi(xi   ai   
Pn
j=1 gijxj) + vi(x i) yields best-replies (1).
In the absence of an upper bound (L = 1), these games have been analyzed in Ballester,
Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2006) and Ballester & Calvó-Armengol (2010). To see what happens,
observe that if x is an equilibrium we have x = a+Gx and hence, through repeated substitutions,
x = a + Ga + 2G2a + :::+ tGta + t+1Gt+1x
for any t 2 N. Denote by max(G) the largest eigenvalue of matrix G. There are two cases. If
max(G) < 1, then there is a unique equilibrium given by x = (I  G) 1a. Under homogeneity
(8i; ai = 1), actions are related to Bonacich centralities in the network.3 In contrast if max(G) 
3The prole of Bonacich centralities is dened as c = (I G)G1 (see Bonacich (1987)), which yields x = 1+c.
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1, there is no equilibrium since the previous series diverges to innity.
Our main new assumption is that actions are bounded from above: 8i; xi  L. Under this
assumption, the strategy space [0; L] is now a complete lattice and since @2ui=@xi@xj = gij  0,
the game with quadratic utilities   is now a supermodular game (see e.g. Denitions and Theorem
4 in Milgrom & Roberts (1990)). Therefore we can apply classical results from the theory of
supermodular games. In particular, a smallest and a largest Nash equilibrium always exist (see
e.g. Theorem 5 in Milgrom & Roberts (1990)). Note that equilibrium conditions only depend on
best-reply functions, so this property holds for any game in our class and not only  .
III. Uniqueness
We now derive our main result.
Theorem 1. Let a 2 Rn and G 2 Rn2 such that ai > 0 and gij  0, 8i; j. Any game with
bounded actions, xi 2 [0; L], and best-replies fi(x i) = min(ai + 
Pn
j=1 gijxj ; L) has a unique
Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Denote by x and x the smallest and largest Nash equilibrium such that for any equilib-
rium x and any i, xi  xi  xi. Denote by I the set of agents who play an interior action in the
smallest equilibrium: I = fi : xi < Lg. Then, xi = L for any i =2 I and any equilibrium x. If I
is empty, the equilibrium is unique. Next, assume that I 6= ?. Given some arbitrary prole of
actions for agents in I, y 2 [0; L]I , dene y^ on [0; L]N by y^I = y and y^i = L if i =2 I. Consider
' the restriction of the best-reply function f to [0; L]I : '(y) = f(y^)I . Holding actions for agents
in NnI at the upper bound, ' describes the best-reply among agents in I.
Observe, rst, that a prole x is an equilibrium i¤x = y^ where y is a xed point of '. Agents
in NnI play the upper bound L in all equilibria. And the equilibrium conditions for agents in I
correspond to the xed point equations of '. Next, we show the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider a system of linear equations of the form yi = bi +
P
j hijyj for all i 2 I, with
bi > 0 and hij  0. If this system admits a non-negative solution y 6= 0, then max(H) < 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a non-negative solution y 6= 0. For any t, we have y = Pts=0Hsb +
Ht+1y. If max(H)  1, the sequence on the right increases without bounds which is a contra-
diction. 
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Finally, we use Lemma 1 to show that the restricted best-reply ' is contracting on [0; L]I . To
see why, observe that yI is a positive solution of the following system of equations: 8i 2 I; yi =
ai + L(
P
j =2I gij) + 
P
j2I gijyj . Apply Lemma 1 to bi = ai + L(
P
j =2I gij) and H = GI .
This means that max(GI) < 1. Denote by  i(y) = bi + 
P
j2I gijyj and observe that 'i(y) =
fi(y^) = min( i(y); L). A linear function is contracting i¤ the largest eigenvalue of its associated
matrix is lower than 1, and hence  is contracting. Then, 8i; j'i(y)   'i(z)j  j i(y)    i(z)j
and hence ' is contracting as well. Thus, ' has a unique xed point, and hence the equilibrium
is unique. QED.
Our proof relies on a principle of partial contraction that could, potentially, have bite in
many other contexts. Note that here when network e¤ects are large, the best-reply function is
not contracting. Small di¤erences in actions may be strongly amplied after a few rounds of
best-replies. However, we show that the best-reply function is contracting on a critical subset
of the original strategy space; namely, the set of actions lying between the smallest and largest
equilibrium. Since any equilibrium belongs to that set, this property of partial contraction is
su¢ cient to guarantee uniqueness. More generally, any supermodular game with such a partially
contracting best-reply has a unique equilibrium.
Therefore, uniqueness prevails even in the presence of large positive network e¤ects. The
structure imposed by linearity somehow disciplines the natural tendency of strategic comple-
mentarities to generate multiple equilibria. Or, viewed from a complementary perspective, the
structure imposed by the strategic complementarities somehow disciplines the tendency of linear
network games to yield multiple equilibria. In short, we could say that linearity and complemen-
tarities discipline each other.4
Theorem 1 allows us to apply and adapt standard results and techniques from the theory of
supermodular games. We begin with comparative statics.
Corollary 1. (Monotone Comparative Statics) For any agent, action in the unique equilibrium
is weakly increasing in a, , G and L.
Proof: Note that in the game with quadratic utilities  , all the following second-order cross
4Uniqueness also hinges on the assumption that idiosyncratic actions ai are all strictly positive. Uniqueness
holds if some, but not all, ai are equal to zero as long as the network is connected. In contrast, in the degenerate
case where 8i; ai = 0, multiple equilibria may emerge.
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derivatives are greater than or equal to zero: @2ui=@xi@ai = 1; @2ui=@xi@aj = 0 if j 6= i;
@2ui=@xi@ =
P
j gijxj ; @
2ui=@xi@gij = xj ; @2ui=@xi@gkl = 0 if kl 6= ij. By Theorem 6 in
Milgrom & Roberts (1990), each individual action xi in the unique equilibrium is then weakly
increasing in all these parameters. Next, let x(L) be the equilibrium at L and consider a change
in upper bound to L0 > L. A rst round of simultanous best-replies from x(L) necessarily leads
to a prole x  x(L). Then, a process of repeated best-replies converges monotonically to the
unique equilibrium at L0 and x(L0)  x(L). QED.
In this context of complementarities, direct and indirect network e¤ects are fully aligned.
Consider, for instance, the impact of connecting two agents. The direct e¤ect of the new link is
to induce both agents to increase their actions if they can. As a consequence, their neighbors
may also increase their actions and hence their neighborsneighbors may increase theirs. The
impact of the new link propagates in the network and all the indirect e¤ects are greater than
or equal to zero. So the action of every other agent increases weakly following the addition of
a new link.5 This stands in sharp contrast to the case of strategic substitutes, where direct and
indirect network e¤ects are generally not aligned and comparative statics are more complicated,
see Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2011).
We are especially interested in the e¤ect of an increase in , which allows to vary the strength
of interactions holding the network structure xed. Our comparative statics result shows that
once an agent reaches the upper bound, he necessarily stays there. This leads to a separation
of the parameter space in three regions. Introduce 1 = inff : 9i : [(I   G) 1a]i  Lg and
2 = maxi(L   ai)=(
Pn
j=1 gijL). Under homogeneity (8i; ai = 1), observe that 2 = 1kmin (1   1L)
where kmin is the lowest degree of the network.
Corollary 2. If G has no isolated agent, the unique equilibrium x is such that 8i; xi < L ,
 < 1 and 8i; xi = L,   2.
Proof. If  is low, the unique equilibrium is given by x = (I   G) 1a. In particular, 8i; xi 
ai + 
P
j gijaj . So as  increases, a non-isolated agent necessarily reaches his upper bound
and this rst happens at 1. Next, the prole where all agents play L is an equilibrium i¤
8i; ai + 
Pn
j=1 gijL  L. This is equivalent to   2. QED.
5The increase is strict in a connected network under small network e¤ects. The increase may not be strict here,
due to the presence of an upper bound, see our discussion of broken interdependence below.
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Thus, we see three domains emerging as a function of . When  < 1, the equilibrium is
interior and action is proportional to Bonacich centrality in the network. When 1   < 2, some
agents have reached the upper bound but others have not. When   2, all agents have reached
the upper bound and action does not depend on the network position. These two thresholds
depend on the upper bound L and on the structure of the network. We emphasize that 2 is often
larger than 1=max(G), the critical value above which actions diverge in the absence of bound.
When some agents reach the upper bound, this dampens the explosive feedbacks and further
postpones the levels for which the remaining agents will also reach it. In addition, the order in
which agents reach the upper bound denes a network-specic ranking. We study below how this
ranking depends on the network structure.
Finally, we note that we can import standard algorithms to our setup. In particular, we know
that in supermodular games, repeated myopic best-replies converge rapidly and monotonically
towards the smallest equilibrium when starting from the lowest prole (8i; xi = 0) and towards
the largest equilibrium when starting from the highest prole (8i; xi = L), see e.g. Vives (1990).6
Therefore, both processes will converge towards the unique equilibrium here. We make use of
these algorithms in our examples below.
IV. Structural properties of the equilibrium
A. Network position and action
In this section, we study how the position of an agent in the network a¤ects his action in equilib-
rium. To better identify the e¤ect of the structure, we assume throughout that agentsactions in
isolation are homogenous (8i; ai = 1) and that links are binary (8i; j; gij 2 f0; 1g). So individuals
only di¤er in their network characteristics. Recall that when network e¤ects are small, action
is aligned with Bonacich centrality. We wish to understand how this is modied under large
network e¤ects.
We rst provide an example where a more central agent ends up playing a lower action.
This shows that action and centrality are generally not aligned under large network e¤ects. In a
second stage, we identify a number of cases where the alignement between action and centrality
6 In addition, a round-robin implementation, when agents take turn in best-replying, converges faster than a
simultaneous implementation, when all agents best-reply at the same time.
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is preserved.
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3
4
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5 6
Figure 1: An example where action and centrality are not aligned.
Consider the graph depicted in Figure 1. It has eight nodes and two cliques: One composed of
agents 1 to 4 and the triangle 6-7-8. In addition, agent 5 in the middle is connected to agents 4 and
6. When  = 0:3 and actions are not bounded, the equilibrium is such that x5  7:9 > x6  5:7.7
Even though agent 6 has one more neighbor than agent 5, his neighbors are not very central. In
contrast, agent 5 is connected to agent 4 who is the most central agent in the graph. When 
is not too low, the e¤ect of indirect paths dominate and agent 5 is more central than agent 6
and play a higher action. Suppose next that actions are bounded from above by L = 5. The
equilibrium is now such that x5  3:7 < x6  4:0.8 Agents 1-4 reach the upper bound and this
reduces the action premium that agent 5 gets from his link with agent 4. Agent 6, who is less
central, now plays a higher action.
We next identify interesting cases where the alignement between action and centrality is
preserved. We rst look at nested neighborhoods. The following result shows that agents who
have less neighbors in the sense of set inclusion always play a weakly lower action.
Proposition 1. Consider two agents i and j. If every neighbor k 6= j of agent i is also a neighbor
of agent j, then xi  xj in the unique equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose rst that gij = 0. Then Ni  Nj )
P
k2Ni x

k 
P
k2Nj x

k and hence x

i =
min(1 + 
P
k2Ni x

k; L)  min(1 + 
P
k2Nj x

k; L) = x

j . Suppose next that gij = 1. Then,
fig [ Ni  fjg [ Nj . We can assume that xj < L (otherwise xi  xj = L). Then (1 + )xj =
1 + 
P
k2fjg[Nj x

k  1 + 
P
k2fig[Ni x

k  f i(x i) + xi = (1 + )xi . QED.
7The whole equilibrium is x  (15:46; 15:46; 15:46; 17:28; 7:89; 5:69; 3:87; 3:87).
8The whole equilibrium is x  (5; 5; 5; 5; 3:70; 3:99; 3:14; 3:14).
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This property of Bonacich centrality therefore extends to large network e¤ects. Thus, an
agent with additional neighbors will reach the upper bound rst as  increases. This allows us to
further characterize the equilibrium for graphs where agents are ordered in a way consistent with
nested neighborhoods. This is, in particular, the case for nested split graphs. In these graphs,
agents can be ordered so that gkl = 1 ) gij = 1 whenever i  k and j  l. They appear, for
instance, as outcomes of network formation processes based on centrality, see König, Tessone &
Zenou (2011). On nested split graphs, ki < kj ) Nin fjg  Nj and centrality and degree are
aligned. A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that on nested split graphs, agents reach the
upper bound precisely in the order of their degrees. A more central agent thus never plays a
lower action.
Nested neighborhoods are not necessary, however, to preserve the alignement between action
and centrality. In particular, we can apply the analysis of Belhaj & Deroïan (2010) to our setup.
They study supermodular games played on the line and on related hierarchical graphs. These
graphs are dened by the following three features. (1) They are structured around a geometric
center and increasingly peripheral layers. (2) Degrees decrease weakly as nodes get further away
from the center. (3) All agents in a given geometric layer have symmetric positions. (See Belhaj
& Deroïan (2010) for a formal denition). Their main result then states that more central agents
cannot play a lower action in the lowest and in the highest equilibrium in these graphs. In our
context, the equilibrium is unique and this yields:
Corollary 3. (Belhaj & Deroïan (2010)) On the line and on related hierarchical graphs, an agent
who is more central plays a weakly higher action in equilibrium.
Finally, the alignement between action and centrality can also be preserved in circumstances
where some agents play the same action. A rst observation, here, is that two individuals who
have symmetric positions in the network must play the same action.9 Next, consider regular
networks. A network is regular of degree k if every agent has k links: 8i;Pj gij = k. On regular
networks, agents have the same degree but may have structurally di¤erent positions. Introduce
 = 1k (1   1L). We can easily check that in a regular graph of degree k, the unique equilibrium
x is such that xi = 1=(1  k) if    and xi = L if   .
9Otherwise, we could build another equilibrium by simply permutating the actions of the players.
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In regular graphs all agents play the same action even under large network e¤ects. All agents
reach their upper bound for the same level of network e¤ects and this threshold level does not
depend on the specic structure of the graph. This stands in sharp contrast to what happens
under strategic substitutes, where agents play the same action in a stable equilibrium only for
small network e¤ects and where the structure of the regular graph strongly a¤ects the level of
interactions above which asymmetric actions emerge, see Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2011).
B. Broken interdependence
In this section, we look at the pattern and extent of interdependencies. An important lesson of the
previous literature is that interdependence is very high under small network e¤ects. Even though
agents interact directly with their network neighbors only, the interplay of strategic interactions
implies that every agent is eventually a¤ected by every other agent in the population when the
network is connected. In contrast, we show here that this interdependence may be broken under
large network e¤ects. The reason is that when an agent reaches his upper bound, he stops being
a transmitter of inuences in the network.
Figure 3: Two communities connected by a bridge.
To illustrate this e¤ect consider the following stylized bridge example, depicted in Figure
3. Society is composed of two communities of equal size. In each community, every agent is
connected to every other agent. In addition, one agent in the rst community is connected to one
agent in the second. So there is a unique link bridging the two communities. Then, if idiosyncratic
actions ai are not too di¤erent, we can show that there exists two threshold level 1 and 

2 such
that the following conditions hold. If  < 1, @xi =@aj > 0 for any two agents i and j in the
population. In particular, agents in one community are a¤ected by shocks on agents in the other
community. Every agent is a¤ected by every other agent. If 1   < 2, xi = L for both bridge
agents; @xi =@aj > 0 for any two non-bridge agents in the same community while @x

i =@aj = 0 if
i lies a one community and j in the other. Finally, if   2, every agent plays the upper bound.
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Under small network e¤ects, the bridging link plays a crucial role: It transmits shocks from one
community to the other. When network e¤ects increase, bridge agents tend to reach the maximal
action rst, because of their more central position. They then become unresponsive to shocks
and this turns o¤ the transmission channel.
More generally, denote by Pi() = fj : (@x

i
@aj
)+ > 0g the set of agents j who indirectly a¤ect
i in the sense that a positive shock on js action leads to an increase in is action.10 Note that
Pi = Nnfig if the graph is connected and  < 1 and that Pi = ? if xi = L. We obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2. As  increases, the set of agents who indirectly a¤ect i, Pi(), shrinks monoton-
ically towards ?.
Proof: Suppose that xi < L and denote by I the set of agents playing an interior action. Denote
by bi = L
P
j =2I gij . We have: x
 = (I   GI) 1(a + b) and hence @xi =@aj = (I   GI) 1ij =P1
t=0 
t(GtI)ij if j 2 I. Therefore, an agent j belongs to Pi i¤ there is a positive integer t such
that (GtI)ij > 0. This means that there exists a path from i to j in which all agents play an
interior action. As  increases, more agents reach the upper bound and this set shrinks. When 
is large enough, everyone plays L and actions are insensitive to marginal changes in aj . QED.
Therefore, the extent of interdependencies is always smaller under higher network e¤ects.
Clearly, the way interdependence is broken depends on the shape of the network and on the
number and the locations of the bridges. This, in turn, depends on the prominence of bridging
agents within their communities. If bridging agents are equally central, or more, within their
own community, as in the example above, we can expect interdependence to be reduced quite
quickly because bridging agents will reach the upper bound rst. But there are contexts where
agents who are better connected externally are also less connected internally. In these situations,
interdependence may be more robust as bridging agents within communities may reach the upper
bound last.
10Note that the left- and right- derivatives of individual action xi with respect to aj may di¤er and (
@xi
@aj
)+
represents the right-derivative here. The analysis carries over to the set of agents j such that a negative shock on
js action leads to a decrease in is action.
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V. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze linear network games under strategic complementarities and with an
upper bound on actions. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We apply standard
results from the literature on supermodular games and characterize structural features of the
equilibrium. In particular, we show that action may not be aligned with Bonacich centrality and
that large network e¤ects tend to break the interdependence.
Our results could be useful for empirical studies of peer e¤ects in networks, see Calvó-
Armengol, Patacchini & Zenou (2009) and Bramoullé, Djebbari & Fortin (2009). A typical
econometric model aimed at studying whether some variable of interest x is subject to peer
e¤ects can be written:
xi = ai + 
X
j
gijxj + "i
where  is the main parameter of interest to be estimated and "i is an error term.11 Most choices
and socio-economic outcomes are naturally bounded from above but existing empirical studies
have neglected these bounds. This likely generates biases in existing estimates. While equilibrium
multiplicity complicates the econometric analysis of games (see e.g. Tamer (2003)), Theorem 1
shows that this is not an issue here. Since the equilibrium x is a function of a; ;G and " we can,
in principle and given some assumption on the error terms, compute the likelihood L(xja; ;G)
and estimate  through maximum likelihood in a straightforward manner. Thus our analysis
provides a stepping stone for an empirical study of peer e¤ects in networks with continuous but
bounded outcomes.
11There are various possible empirical specications for the as (including individual covariates and, possibly,
contextual peer e¤ects), the gs (linear-in-sum or linear-in-means), and the error terms ".
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